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Abstract
We present a model where it can be optimal for rational informed speculators/arbitragers to ride the
bubble instead of using their information for stabilising purposes. This result stems from the interaction
of speculators with behavioural traders. These latter in each period of time either discover the true
fundamental value of the asset, or use a positive feedback strategy. We study the equilibrium strategy
profiles of speculators in the case of short and long horizons and derive the resulting average expected
excess deviation of the asset price. Further we consider the possibility of market manipulation and its
consequences on the market eﬃciency.
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1 Introduction
The eﬃcient market hypothesis relies on the assumption of rationality of all agents and on the
stabilising power of arbitrage: backwards induction or a transversality condition precludes bub-
bles1 , and mispricings are corrected through arbitrage. Consequently, prices in each point in
time reflect fully the information available about the fundamentals. Recent literature, relaxes the
assumption that all agents are fully rational and focuses on the interaction between rational and
irrational agents. This literature shows how limits to arbitrage arise and how these limits lead,
for example, to excess deviations of asset price, overreaction to news and bubbles2 .
Limits to arbitrage are not always suﬃcient to explain the behaviour of informed rational
traders. Forces weakening the stabilising forces of arbitragers are highlighted, such as, for example,
fundamental risk, (see, Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002), noise trader risk, (see Shleifer and Vishny,
1997) and syncronisation risk (see Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2002). These models succeed in
explaining the limited power of arbitragers in stabilising the asset market, but not why these
informed traders invest in overpriced assets.
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2003) find that hedge funds, which are among the most sophisticated
traders, during the time of the Technology Bubble on NASDAQ were heavily tilted towards
technology stocks. Further, they find that hedge funds reduced their holdings before the price
collapsed. Thus, hedge funds managers timed the market, i.e. they invested in the stock as long
as prices continued to rise, while they sold the stock just before the price correction started. They
conclude that these traders were riding the bubble for some time before attacking the same.
We build a model which rationalises this behaviour of informed arbitragers/speculators. We
consider the case of an innovation to the asset occurring far away in the future, and arbi-
tragers/speculators being informed about this innovation. In our model, rational speculators
interact with behavioural traders. We assume that the latter, in each period of time, discover
1 See for example Tirole (1982) and Santos and Woodford (1997) for a discussion.
2 For a survey see Shiller (2002), Barberis and Thaler (2002) and Shleifer (2000).
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with a given probability the true value of the asset which becomes in this way common knowl-
edge. If they do not discover the true value of the asset, then they engage in positive feedback
trading (as in De Long et al. , 1990), i.e. buy the asset if its price increased, sell it if its price
decreased. Extrapolative expectations and trend chasing strategies are among the most prominent
factors leading to positive feedback trading3 . Thus, for example, if the asset price increased at
level above its fundamental value, speculators have to trade oﬀ the opportunity of further desta-
bilising the asset price, i.e. buying the asset, trying to anticipate positive feedback trading of
behavioural traders in the next period, with the opportunity of stabilising the asset price, i.e.
selling short the asset, trying to exploit the possibility that the asset price jumps back to its
fundamental value in the next period of time.
The main purpose of the paper is to focus on the interaction between informed speculators and
behavioural traders in a multiperiod framework, and to study the implications of short versus long
horizons4 and the implication of market manipulation power for the strategy profile of informed
speculators and for the average expected excess deviation of the asset price from its fundamental
value.
We consider an initial situation where the time horizon spanning the arrival of an innovation
is much larger than the trade horizon of speculators. Speculators are informed about the arrival
of these innovations, but have limited horizons indicating prohibitively large costs of long-term
arbitrage/speculation. For the shake of simplicity we assume that these agents live only for two
periods, and thus overlapping generations of speculators span the whole time horizon.
We study the optimal, conditional strategy profile of speculators and their consequences on
the asset price. We show that if the probability that the true value of the asset becomes common
knowledge in the next period is suﬃciently large, then they engage in a stabilising strategy. On
the other hand, the lower is this probability, the larger is the number of generations of speculators
3 See Shleifer (2000), chapter 6, for a more detailed discussion on the use of positive feedback strategies.
4 Froot et al. (1992) study the implications of short vs. long horizons of speculators for asset price dynamics in
the context of information acquisition.
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destabilising the asset market.
Thus, if the innovation to the asset occurs far away in the future, speculators can find it optimal
to destabilise the asset price for some time and profit from the trading with uninformed behavioural
agents. Informed speculators do not use the private information they have, but instead herd on
the behaviour of past speculators. Speculators ride the bubble for some time before attacking the
same. The stabilising force of arbitrage due to informed agents eventually works out, but with
some delay.
We compare these result with the situation where speculators have long horizons. We show
that the average expected excess deviation5 of the asset price from its fundamental value is lower
in the case of short horizons than in the case of long horizons. Thus, shortening the horizon
of the speculators is beneficial for market eﬃciency. Thus, we recover a result of Shleifer and
Vishny (1997): the smaller the time horizon of arbitragers/speculators, the lower is their impact
on equilibrium prices. On the other hand, our conclusion in terms of asset market eﬃciency is the
opposite: shortening speculators time horizon increases on average market eﬃciency.
Further, we study also the equilibrium in the case where speculators with short horizons
can manipulate the information in the asset market. In particular, we assume that if behavioural
traders observe subsequent generations of speculators buying the asset, then these traders increase
even more their demand thinking that the asset is still undervalued. We show that, under certain
conditions, the resulting equilibrium strategies of speculators turn out to depend also on the choice
of subsequent speculators and consequently on the action chosen by the chain of speculators
spanning the whole time horizon (see Dow and Gorton, 1994). Thus, speculators destabilise
the asset market today, manipulating the information in the asset market, in order to trigger
additional, future demand of behavioural traders. This can lead to a chain of speculative trading
which destabilises completely the asset market. Further, we show that, under certain conditions,
5 The average is taken over the probability that the true value of the asset becomes common knowledge in the
next period.
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the average expected excess deviation of the asset price from its fundamental value is an increasing
function of the size of this additional demand of behavioural traders. Consequently, the larger is
the manipulative power of speculators, i.e. the larger is the additional demand they can trigger,
the less eﬃcient is the asset market.
In Section 2 we briefly review the related literature. Section 3 introduces the model, in Section
3.1 we describe the equilibrium strategies in the case of short horizons, while in Section 4 we
compare these results with the case where speculators have long horizons. In Section 5 we study
the case of market manipulation and arbitrage chains. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
The paper is most similar to De Long et al. (1990). The authors study the situation where
speculators interact with behavioural traders using a positive feedback strategy. In their model
is assumed that speculators have long horizons since they can hold their position without any
temporal constraint. They show that speculators, instead of stabilising the asset price in the case
of excess deviation, destabilise the asset price anticipating demand from positive feedback traders.
Thus, informed speculators in their model have a destabilising function and not a stabilising func-
tion. In our model arbitragers/speculators can have either a destabilising or a stabilising function,
depending on the probability of public disclosure of information and on their manipulative power.
Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) highlight a diﬀerent source leading informed, rational agents
to ride a bubble until it reaches a critical level. In their model the stabilising forces of arbitragers
are initially inhibited because of a syncronisation risk. Each informed agent has a negligible
impact on the asset price, thus coordination is required among informed agents in order to move
and correct the asset price. Further, in their model there is also a competition eﬀect at work since
arbitragers waiting too long miss the profit opportunity.
Other models generating speculative bubbles are Hart and Kreps (1978) and Scheinkman and
Xiong (2003), where agents have heterogeneous beliefs, and agree to disagree. In Allen and Gorton
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(1993) asymmetric information between investors and portfolio managers lead the latter to churn
bubbles. In Hart and Kreps (1986) study a model where rational speculators with short horizons
interact with consumers whose demand is random. The authors show that destabilising speculation
can be a rational expectation equilibrium. Brunnermeier (2001) reviews numerous other papers
on bubbles.
3 The model
Consider an economy consisting of T periods. There are two types of assets: a risky one and a
riskless one. The latter yields zero net return (r = 0), while the former does not distribute any
dividends, but its final value is not known to everyone in the economy. Further, we assume that
the supply of the risky asset is unitary. For each t < 0, the value of the asset is V and its price is
Pt = V . In t = 0 an innovation to the fundamentals occurs, becoming common knowledge with
probability 1 only in t = 4, i.e. P4 = V4 = V + φ, φ > 0. Time is discrete.
There are two types of agents: informed speculators and behavioural traders. While the
former have perfect information about the true value of the asset, the latter have only incomplete
information.
Informed speculators have perfect information about the final value of the asset, but have
limited horizons, capturing high costs of long-term arbitrage. In particular, we assume that they
live for two periods only. Thus, there are overlapping generations of young and old speculators
in each period of time. We abstract from strategic interaction between speculators assuming that
each generation consists of a unit mass of speculators behaving in a competitive way (i.e. taking
prices as given). When young, speculators have to decide either to engage in a stabilising strategy
or in a destabilising one, while when old they have to close their position. For simplicity, we
assume that these agents are risk neutral, but have limited funds D.6 Thus, their position is
6 Otherwise, assuming that arbitragers are risk-averse but have not limited funds lead to qualitatively similar
results.
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limited by ±D and their (aggregate) demand in period t is given by ± DPt . Initial endowment of
informed speculators is such that eventual losses can always be covered.
Behavioural traders have non-limited horizons. In particular, we assume that there is a con-
tinuum of influx and outflux of these agents from the market with diﬀerent time horizons, and
adding up to an aggregate demand. The single agents open and close continuously their position,
making either profits or losses. Each behavioural trader receives a noisy signal φ0 about the final,
true value of the asset and update their demand accordingly. Assuming that there are many be-
havioural traders in the market and that the noise of the signal is uncorrelated with mean zero we
have that φ0 = φ. We introduce probability δ which indicates the probability that the information
becomes common knowledge in the next period of time. Thus, with probability δ behavioural
trader learn the true value of the asset which becomes common knowledge and consequently the
price jumps towards its fundamentals. If behavioural traders have not learned the true value of
the asset, then they engage in positive feedback trading. Thus, given that they did not discover
the true value of the asset, their aggregate demand for the risky asset in period t ≥ 0 is given by
Q (t) =
V + φ+D0 (Pt−1 − Pt−2)
Pt
(1)
Thus, the larger is the price increase over a time period, the more are the behavioural traders
buying the asset.
The optimal strategy of informed speculators depends on the strategies of past speculators,
on the size of the feedback trading, on the probability δ and also on the action of the subsequent
generation of speculators. Thus, prices and strategies are path dependent. First, we introduce
some notation.
Definition 1 P
{a}t
t , where {a}t = {a0, a1, ..., ai, ..., at}, indicates the equilibrium price in
period t, given the strategy ai of speculators belonging to generation i, where ai ∈ {s, d}, and s
indicates a stabilising strategy and d indicates a destabilising strategy.
Definition 2 E
³
πat{a}t−1,at+1
´
is the expected profit of generation t speculators using strategy
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at, given the history of strategies of previous speculators {a}t−1 and given that speculators of
generation t+ 1 use strategy at+1; E
³
πa0{0},a1
´
if t = 0.
Definition 3 δt is the critical value of δ where an = d, for each 0 ≤ n ≤ t− 1, and at+1 = d
such that if δ < δt then at = d is a best response. In other words, E
³
πd{d}t−1,d
´
> E
³
πs{d}t−1,d
´
for each δ < δt
Definition 4 δt is the critical value of δ, where at = d, for each 0 ≤ n ≤ t, and at+1 = s
such that if δ < δt then at = d is a best response. In other words, E
³
πd{d}t−1,s
´
> E
³
πs{d}t−1,s
´
for each δ < δt.
3.1 Equilibrium
For the following we assume that 0 < D < D0φ and that the innovation to the asset occurs at
T = 4. We can state the first result:
Lemma 1
1) δt ≤ δt for each 0 ≤ t ≤ 2
2) δt+1 < δt for each 0 ≤ t ≤ 1
3) δt+1 < δt for each 0 ≤ t ≤ 1
Proof. We have to calculate expected profits for each possible strategy, and find the critical
value of δ. In the following we sketch the main results.
The condition such that E
³
πd0,d
´
> E
³
πs0,d
´
and E
¡
πd0,s
¢
> E
¡
πs0,s
¢
reduces to δ0 = δ0 = 1.
Thus, as long as δ < 1, speculators in 0 destabilise the asset price independently of the strategy
used by the subsequent generation of speculators.
The optimal strategy of speculators in 1 depends on the strategy used by speculators in 2.
Thus, if a2 = d, then a1 = d is a best response as long as E
³
πdd,d
´
> E
³
πsd,d
´
, i.e.
δ < δ1 =
(D0 − 1) [D0 (φ+D)−D]
D0 (φ+D) + (D0 − 1) [D0 (φ+D)−D]
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On the other hand, given that a2 = s, we have that a1 = d is a best response as long as
E
³
πdd,s
´
> E
³
πsd,s
´
, i.e.
δ < δ1 =
(D0 − 1) [D0 (φ+D)−D]− 2D
D0 (φ+D) + (D0 − 1) [D0 (φ+D)−D]− 2D
Straightforward algebra shows that δ1 < δ1, δ1 < δ0 = 1 and δ1 < δ0 = 1.
Now, consider the optimal strategy for speculators in 2. This latter depends on the strategy
chosen by speculators in 3. Given that a3 = d, a2 = d is a best response as long as E
³
πddd,d
´
>
E
³
πsdd,d
´
, i.e.
δ < δ2 =
D02 (D0 − 2) (φ+D)−D (D0 − 1)
D02 (φ+D) +D02 (D0 − 2) (φ+D)−D (D0 − 1)
Further, given that a3 = s, a2 = d is a best response as long as E
³
πddd,s
´
> E
³
πsdd,s
´
, i.e.
δ < δ2 =
D02 (D0 − 2) (φ+D)−D (D0 + 1)
D02 (φ+D) +D02 (D0 − 2) (φ+D)−D (D0 + 1)
It is easy to see that δ2 < δ2 and that δ2 < δ1 < δ0 = 1 and δ2 < δ1 < δ0 = 1.
The critical values of δ depend, among others, on the size of positive feedback trading, i.e. D0.
For D0 < 1 we observe that δ1 as well as δ2 are both negative. Further, as long as D0 < 2, δ2 < 0.
In order to rule out the trivial case, we assume, for the following, that D0 is suﬃciently large, such
that δ2 > 0.
We are able to state the following Proposition which characterises the conditional strategy
profile of speculators.
Proposition 1 Conditional on the information not being revealed previous to period 4, the fol-
lowing results hold:
a) if 0 < δ < δ2, then the equilibrium strategies are a0 = a1 = a2 = d and a3 = s
b) if δ2 ≤ δ < δ1, then the equilibrium strategies are a0 = a1 = d and a2 = a3 = s
c) if δ1 ≤ δ < 1, then the equilibrium strategies are a0 = d and a1 = a2 = a3 = s
Proof. Since at t = 4 the value of the asset becomes common knowledge, a3 = s is optimal.
Part a) and b) of Proposition 1 follow straightforwardly from Lemma 2. In order to prove
part c) of the proposition, we have to show that δ∗, defined as the critical level of δ such that
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Figure 1: δt (continuous line) and δt (discontinuous line) as a function of t. D0 = 2.5, D = 2,
φ = 1. The star indicates gδ∗.
E
³
πdds,s
´
< E
³
πsds,s
´
for each δ > δ∗, is lower than δ1, i.e. δ
∗ < δ1. Simple algebra shows that
δ∗ =
D02 (D0 − 2) (φ+D)−D (D0 − 1) (2D0 − 1)
D02 (φ+D)− 2DD0 +D02 (D0 − 2) (φ+D)−D (D0 − 1) (2D0 − 1)
It is easy to see that δ∗ < δ2. From Lemma 1 we know that δ1 > δ2 and so the result is established.
Proposition 1 shows that if δ is suﬃciently large, i.e. δ1 ≤ δ < 1, then all but the first
generation of speculators stabilise the asset price. On the other hand, the lower is δ, the larger is
the number of speculators using a destabilising strategy. In particular, for 0 < δ < δ2, i.e. very
low values of δ, all but the last generation of speculators destabilise the asset price.
In Figure 1 we have that δ1 = 0.52381, δ2 = 0.253731, δ1 = 0.361702, and δ2 = 0.112426.
Consequently, for each δ < 0.112426 the optimal strategy is a0 = a1 = a2 = d and a3 = s, i.e.
complete destabilisation of the asset market. For 0.361702 > δ ≥ 0.112426 the optimal strategy
is a0 = a1 = d and a2 = a3 = s, while for 1 > δ ≥ 0.361702 the optimal strategy is a0 = d and
a1 = a2 = a3 = s.
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4 Long horizons
In this section we focus on the problem of a representative speculator having long horizons. Also
in this case we assume that speculators behave in a competitive way.
The representative speculator has again perfect information about the fundamental value of
the asset, and he knows that with probability δ this information becomes common knowledge in
the next period of time, while with probability 1−δ positive feedback traders arrive in the market.
Thus, in each period of time, speculators have to decide whether to continue to destabilise the
asset market trying to gain from trading with behavioural traders in the next period, or to stabilise
the asset market.
Speculators in 0 do not have any incentive to stabilise the asset price as long as δ < 1. If
speculators in period t = 0 buy the asset, then the problem of finding the optimal strategy profile
reduces to the problem of finding the optimal period of attacking the bubble, i.e. stabilising the
asset. The gain from stabilising at time t is given by
2
³
P {d}t−1,s − V − φ
´
−D
The expected gain of stabilising the asset market at time t+ 1 is given by
(1− δ)
h
2
³
P {d}t,s − V − φ
´
−D
i
− δD
Stabilisation at time t > 0 is an optimal strategy as long as
δ > δLt =
P {d}t,s − P {d}t−1,s
P {d}t,s − V − φ
(2)
We can state the following Lemma.
Lemma 2
1) δLt+1 < δ
L
t for each 0 ≤ t ≤ 1
2) δt < δ
L
t for each 1 ≤ t ≤ 3, while δL0 = δ0 = 1
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Figure 2: δt (continuous line) and δ
L
t (discontinuous line) as a function of t. D
0 = 2.5, D = 2,
φ = 1.
Proof. Here we just sketch the intermediate results. Using (2) we have that
δL1 =
D0 (D0 − 1) (D + φ)
D02 (D + φ)−D
δL2 =
D02 (D0 − 2) (D + φ)
D02 (D0 − 1) (D + φ)−D
We are able to state the following Proposition which characterises the conditional strategy
profile of speculators having long horizons.
Proposition 2 Conditional on the information not being revealed previous to period 4, the fol-
lowing results hold:
a) if 0 < δ < δL2 , then the equilibrium strategies are a0 = a1 = a2 = d and a3 = s
b) if δL2 ≤ δ < δL1 , then the equilibrium strategies are a0 = a1 = d and a2 = a3 = s
c) if δL1 ≤ δ < 1, then the equilibrium strategies are a0 = d and a1 = a2 = a3 = s
Proof. Proposition 2 is a consequence of Lemma 2.
For the following our statements are conditional on the true value of the asset not being revealed
in periods previous to T = 4. Consider the situation depicted in Figure 2, where δ1 = 0.361702,
and δ2 = 0.112426, while δ
L
1 = 0.671642, and δ
L
2 = 0.358852. Thus, for each δ < 0.112426,
speculators destabilise completely the asset market, independently of their time horizon. For
0.358852 > δ ≥ 0.112426, we have that in the case of short horizons, the asset market is not
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completely destabilised (optimal strategy: a0 = a1 = d and a2 = a3 = s), while in the case of long
horizons, the asset market is completely destabilised (a0 = a1 = a2 = d and a3 = s). Increasing
further δ we observe that for 0.361702 > δ ≥ 0.358852, independent of the time horizon speculators
face, the optimal strategy is a0 = a1 = d and a2 = a3 = s. For 0.671642 > δ ≥ 0.361702 the
asset market is less destabilised if speculators have short horizons (optimal strategy: a0 = d and
a1 = a2 = a3 = s) than in the case where they have long horizons (optimal strategy: a0 = a1 = d
and a2 = a3 = s). For 1 > δ ≥ 0.671642 we observe that in cases the optimal strategy is a0 = d
and a1 = a2 = a3 = s.
We are able to prove the main proposition of this section.
Proposition 3 The average expected excess deviation of the asset price, where the average has
been taken over all possible values of δ, is lower if speculators have short horizons than in the case
where speculators have long horizons.
Proof. The diﬀerence between the average expected excess deviation of the asset price in the
case of long horizons (EL) and short horizons (ES) is given by
EL −ES = D + [D +D0 (D + φ)]
hR δL1
0
(1− δ) f (δ) dδ −
R δ1
0
(1− δ) f (δ) dδ
i
+
[D0 (D + φ)−D]
hR 1
δL
1
(1− δ) f (δ) dδ −
R 1
δ1
(1− δ) f (δ) dδ
i
+£
D +D02 (D + φ)
¤ hR δL2
0
(1− δ)2 f (δ) dδ −
R δ
2
0
(1− δ)2 f (δ) dδ
i
+£
D02 (D + φ)−D
¤ hR δL1
δL2
(1− δ)2 f (δ) dδ −
R δ1
δ2
(1− δ)2 f (δ) dδ
i
+£
D02 (D + φ)−D − 2DD0
¤ hR 1
δL
1
(1− δ)2 f (δ) dδ −
R 1
δ
1
(1− δ)2 f (δ) dδ
i
+
+
£
D02 (D0 − 1) (D + φ)−D
¤ hR δL2
0
(1− δ)3 f (δ) dδ −
R δ2
0
(1− δ)3 f (δ) dδ
i
+£
D02 (D0 − 1) (D + φ)−D − 2DD0
¤ hR δL1
δL2
(1− δ)3 f (δ) dδ −
R δ
1
δ2
(1− δ)3 f (δ) dδ
i
+£
D02 (D0 − 1) (D + φ)−D − 2DD02
¤ hR 1
δL1
(1− δ)3 f (δ) dδ −
R 1
δ1
(1− δ)3 f (δ) dδ
i
where f (δ) is a probability density function of δ. Now from Lemma 2 we obtain the result.
Proposition 3 states that, shortening speculators time horizons is beneficial in the sense that
the average expected deviation of the asset price is lower, and consequently the asset market is,
on average, more eﬃcient.
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5 Market manipulation and arbitrage chains
In this section we consider the case where speculators can manipulate the asset market. We assume
that behavioural traders can observe the action of speculators and if they observe that speculators
continue to buy the asset, then they increase demand in period 2. In particular, we assume that a
sequence of strategies {d, d, d} can trigger additional demand of 2kP units from behavioural traders
in period 2. The size of k ≥ 0 measures the market manipulation power of speculators.
We consider the case where arbitragers have short horizons. δ
M
2 (k) is the critical value of δ
in period 2 such that for each δ larger than this critical value, stabilisation for generation 2 is
optimal. More formally, E
³
πd{d}1,s
´
> E
³
πs{d}1,s
´
for each δ < δ2 (k) .
The following lemma can be proved.
Lemma 3
1) δ
M
2 (0) = δ2
2) δ
M
2 (k) is an increasing function of k.
3) limk→∞ δ
M
2 (k) =
D0−1
D0
Proof. Simple algebra shows that
δ
M
2 (k) =
D02 (D0 − 2) (D + φ)−D (D0 + 1) + (D0 − 1) k
D02 (D0 − 2) (D + φ)−D (D0 + 1) +D02 (D + φ) +D0k
Taking the first derivative of δ
M
2 (k) with respect to k and rearranging terms, we obtain
∂
∂k
δ
M
2 (k) =
D02 (D + φ) +D (D0 + 1)
[D02 (D0 − 2) (D + φ)−D (D0 + 1) +D02 (D + φ) +D0k]2
> 0
We are able to prove the following proposition defining the optimal, conditional strategy profile
of speculators.
Proposition 4 Conditional on the information not being revealed previous to period 4, for each
k ≥ k∗ = D
0(D+φ)(D+D02φ)
D(1+D0) , where δ
M
2 (k
∗) = δ1, the following results hold.
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Figure 3: δ
M
2 (0) (continuous line), δ
M
2 (15) ( — - — - line), δ
M
2 (75) (— — — line) and δt (dots) as a
function of t. D0 = 2.5, D = 2, φ = 1.
a) If δ
M
2 (k) < δ1 then for each δ < δ
M
2 (k) the optimal strategy profile is a0 = d, a1 = d, a2 = d,
a3 = s, while for each 1 > δ ≥ δ
M
2 (k) the optimal strategy profile is a0 = d, a1 = s, a2 = s,
a3 = s.
b) If δ
M
2 (k) > δ1 then for each δ < δ1 the optimal strategy profile is a0 = d, a1 = d, a2 = d,
a3 = s, while for each 1 > δ ≥ δ1 the optimal strategy profile is a0 = d, a1 = s, a2 = s, a3 = s.
Proof. Propostion 4 is a consequence of Lemma 1 and Lemma 3.
From Proposition 4 we observe that if k is suﬃciently large, then the destabilisation of the asset
market occurs through arbitrage chains. In other words, speculators choice depend in a crucial
way on the strategy used by the subsequent generation of speculators. Further, we observe that
small changes in δ can lead to large changes in the strategy profile of speculators and consequently
to a large change in the asset price dynamics, while large changes in δ lead to no change at all.
In Figure 3 we have that δ1 = 0.52381, δ1 = 0.361702, δ2 = δ
M
2 (0) = 0.112426, δ
M
2 (15) =
0.424307, and k∗ = 8.83929. Thus, for each given k > 8.83929, we have that, for each δ <
min
n
δ
M
2 (k) , δ1
o
, the asset market is completely destabilised, while for 1 > δ ≥ min
n
δ
M
2 (k) , δ1
o
just generation 0 speculators destabilise the asset market, while the subsequent generations sta-
bilise it. min
n
δ
M
2 (k) , δ1
o
is a threshold which separates the complete destabilisation regime from
the quasi-complete stabilisation regime. In Figure 3, we observe that for k = 15, this threshold
is δ
M
2 (15) = 0.424307. For k = 75, we observe that δ
M
2 (75) = 0.550629 > δ1 = 0.52381 and
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Figure 4: δc as a function of k; k = 45.625. D0 = 2.5, D = 2, φ = 1.
consequently the threshold is δ1 = 0.52381.
We can further characterise the complete destabilisation regime.
Lemma 4 Call δc the critical value of δ such that complete destabilisation of the asset market
occurs for each δ < δc. Then, for each k ∈ [0, k), where
k =
D0 (D + φ)
¡
D +D02φ+ 2D0D
¢
D (D0 − 1)
δc = δ
M
2 (k) is an increasing function of k, while for each k ≥ k, δc = δ1.
Proof. Notice that δ
M
2
¡
k
¢
= δ1, where k =
D0(D+φ)(D+D02φ+2D0D)
D(D0−1) . Thus, from the Lemma 1
we know that if δ > δ1, then, even though a2 = d, the optimal strategy for generation 1 speculators
is a1 = s. This fact, together with the results stated in Proposition 4 proves the Lemma.
In Figure 4 we graph δc as a function of k using our previous numerical example.
We are able to prove the main proposition of this section.
Proposition 5 The average expected excess deviation of the asset price, where the average has
been taken over all possible values of δ, is an increasing function of k, for each k ∈ [0, k).
Proof. We define δa (k) = δ1 − δ
M
2 (k), and E
S (k) as defined in the proof of Proposition 3
just instead of δ2 we have now δ
M
2 (k). Consequently, E
S (k) is an increasing function of k. The
average expected deviation E (k) is given by
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E (k) = D + I (δa (k) > 0)ES (k)+
I (δa (k) < 0)



Rminnδ1,δM2 (k)o
0 [D +D
0 (D + φ)] (1− δ) f (δ) dδ +
R 1
min{δ1,δM2 (k)} [D
0 (D + φ)−D] (1− δ) f (δ) dδ+
Rminnδ1,δM2 (k)o
0
£
D +D02 (D + φ)
¤
(1− δ)2 f (δ) dδ+
Rminnδ1,δM2 (k)o
δ1
£
D02 (D + φ)−D − 2DD0
¤
(1− δ)2 f (δ) dδ+
Rminnδ1,δM2 (k)o
0
£
D02 (D0 − 1) (D + φ)−D
¤
(1− δ)3 f (δ) dδ+R 1
min{δ1,δM2 (k)}
£
D02 (D0 − 1) (D + φ)−D − 2DD02
¤
(1− δ)3 f (δ) dδ+
o
where I (·) is an indicator function.
Using Lemma 4, we observe that E (k) is an increasing function of k for each k ∈ [0, k).
Proposition 5 states that, as long as k < k, the larger the market manipulation power of be-
havioural traders, the larger is the average expected deviation of the asset price, and consequently
the lower is, on average, the market eﬃciency.
6 Conclusion
We studied a simple multiperiod model where behavioural traders interact with rational informed
speculators. We studied the incentives of speculators to destabilise the asset price instead of using
their private information for stabilising purposes. We showed that rational speculators can find it
optimal to destabilise the asset price, and to ride the bubble for some time. Private incentives in
our model are a syncronisation device for rational speculators.
We studied the impact of short vs. long horizons on the incentives of speculators and showed
that long horizons lead to increased incentives to destabilise the market. Further, if speculators
have market manipulation power, the larger is this power, the larger are the incentives to destabilise
16
the market. Thus, long horizons and a larger market power lead, on average, speculators to ride
the bubble for a longer time and consequently the market eﬃciency is, on average, lower.
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